JADC2 Cannot Exist Without Zero Trust
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is arguably the most ambitious, promising, and paradigm-shifting concept in the history of warfighting, but it is doomed to fail if a fundamental characteristic does not exist: pervasive and unequivocally trust that the mission will not be adversely affected by these foundational changes. Make no mistake, JADC2 is a massive, difficult undertaking which will require deep and broad changes within technology, people, process, and military doctrine to earn this trust.
The end-goal of being able to conduct all-domain (air, land, sea, space, cyber) operations in a coordinated manner across a heterogeneous battlespace asset inventory will require incredibly complex and exquisitely subtle integrations between platforms which were never designed to interact in the first place. This challenge increases exponentially when we include coalition forces into this effort, but we must commit to this endeavor to remain competitive in an increasingly sophisticated adversarial battlespace, and trust is absolutely key to its success.
Without a high degree of trust, how can we hope to advance or implement JADC2 if every stakeholder across every service branch (and coalition) fears integrations between previously-siloed platforms and the potential for introducing devastating and wide-ranging new attack pathways? How can we expect to field integrations that automatically coordinate all-doman effects if the weapon systems operators themselves don’t trust the platforms they rely on? How can we hope to effectively cross battle lines in a joint warfighting concept if broad and deep trust does not exist across those lines?
A similar trust dilemma exists across the industry, both in commercial and public sector organizations which are pursuing digital transformation efforts, since breaking down silos and sharing data across teams is foundational to successful transformation. But just like with JADC2, there is often resistance due to this fundamental lack of trust between teams.
To build trust, JADC2 architects must start with Zero Trust. This seems contradictory at first, making data and systems broadly accessible, while at the same time removing all implicit trust and tightly protecting data and systems. But if Zero Trust is thought of as an architectural philosophy that increases confidence in a system’s security by aligning highly granular perimeters with dynamic, contextualized policy enforcement to system functions, those systems can be made more freely accessible with less risk due to the deep understanding and assurance in those systems that Zero Trust confers. This greatly differs from bolt-on security approaches which often increases friction and decreases collaboration, Zero Trust enables siloes to be broken down safely, and as a result, new value/capabilities are realized due to the freedom of making data/systems more accessible to more stakeholders. JADC2 is precisely that: connecting things together to make possible what was previously impossible.
Taken in this context, Zero Trust is not a “necessary burden” for JADC2, but rather a foundational requirement for its very existence. JADC2 cannot exist without data and systems being shared freely between service branches and coalition partners. Building JADC2 in alignment with Zero Trust principles enables this freedom, ensuring that only permitted entities can access data/systems at only approved times and conditions in an environment-agnostic way, transcending traditional network perimeter-based security approaches, and may even allow us to achieve seamless, ubiquitous multi-level security for data.
These are all critical characteristics needed by the highly dynamic, multi/hybrid cloud and edge architectures that modern warfare requires; security cannot remain static and network-perimeter bound, since the fight is neither of those things. It is also critically important that open software, standards, and architectures be prioritized, since the only way JADC2 will work is if its builders are doing so consistently with tools they are allowed to access, whether they are a US citizen or a coalition partner. There is also no “Zero Trust end state” for a system as complex as JADC2, and building with open standards and software will allow for flexibility to adapt to the security requirements of both the known and unknown unknowns.
As the defense industry works alongside the warfighting community to make JADC2 a reality, it is comforting to think about Zero Trust as an opportunity for us to “get security right,” and to do so in a way that will prevent JADC from reaching its full potential due to systemic distrust. This is the time to correct years of low granularity, macro-perimeter security engineering which too often causes more problems than it solves. Fortunately, JADC2 is still in its early stages, and we can all work together to ensure that the component systems and data flows are well understood and architected in a way that every participant, every warfighter, and every leader is willing to trust for winning today’s and tomorrow’s fight.